This paper studies the stability, equilibrium and effi ciency of directed networks of trade intermediaries under a rule of equi-repartition of profi ts. This equi-repartition rule, although simple and natural, introduces complex topologic considerations from players. Core-periphery structures can arise endogenously and result in stable networks even assuming complete homogeneity of all agents in the network. The concept of network partition is introduced to provide examples of networks that could be seen as arising from the linking up of a set of disjoint networks in an endogenous manner. From an aggregate welfare perspective as well as sometimes from an individual perspective, leaving the linking up of those individually effi cient networks to each individual agent can result in an ineffi cient aggregate network, even if taken in isolation each pre-existing network is effi cient.
INTRODUCTION
Network economics modelling has been successfully applied over the last decade to describe economic phenomenon as diverse as the social transmission of job information (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson), free-trade agreements (Goyal and Joshi) , and co-authorship links (Jackson and Wolinsky) . Network economics have also provided models that are phrased in general terms and can thus potentially be applied to a variety of situations (see for example Bala and Goyal, Bellefl amme and Bloch, Dutta and al, Goyal and Vega-Redondo, Jackson) . Concerns about the fi nancial resilience of the banking system has led to a renewed interest in the modelling of the complex links between fi nancial institutions. Of particular importance are networks of intermediaries related to trading between banks and fi nancial institutions. Recent empirical evidence suggests that these trading relationships follow a core-periphery structure, whereby a group of banks in the core are densely linked to each other and a set of peripheral banks maintain links with banks from the core, but not between each others (Craig, Veld, Fricke) . In this paper Three networks have a particular signifi cance when studying trade or settlement networks: the empty network, which is a network with no link which generally refl ects too high costs for establishing a link compared to the expected profi ts derived from it, the complete network, which contains all possible links and which indicates the highest desire for disintermediation, and the complete star network, where one node, the center of the star, is linked in both directions to all other nodes, the leaves of the star. Hence any trade in a complete star network involves the center of the star. Figure 2 depicts these three particular types of networks.
Defi ning intermediation paths and payoffs of the games
, , w c g G k n 0^h For each edge AB there is a cost w AB to build the edge AB, and a cost c AB to use it in an intermediation chain. For each pair of vertices there is a latent intermediation profi t g AB that can be realised and shared if there is at least one admissible intermediation path from A to B. We make these notions more precise in this section. A complete star with 6 leaves, the empty network on 5 nodes and the complete network on 4 nodes.
Defi nition 1 A path is a network P whose nodes can be labelled V (P) = {u 1 , u 2 , ..., u k } such that its set of edges is precisely E(P) = {(u 1 , u 2 ), ..., (u k−1 , u k )}. We often write P = u 1 , u 2 ,. .., u k in this case, and say that P is a u 1 u k -path, or a path from u 1 to u k . The length of P is k −1, while its cardinality is k.
Note that our notion of path has a direction: a path from u to v is not a path from v to u, at least when u ≠ v.
Defi nition 2 Let G and H be two networks. Then H is a subnetwork of G if, and only if, V (H) ⊆ V (G) and E(H) ⊆ E(G).

Defi nition 3 A path of a network G is a path that is a subnetwork of G.
Let n and k 0 be two positive integers, N a set of nodes of cardinality n and w, c, and g real-valued functions defi ned on the cartesian product N 2 = N × N. Players are the nodes in N and decide to link, or not, to other nodes. Hence the action set of a given player u is the set of edges (u, v) for v ∈ N, v ≠ u. If node u establishes the link (u, v) to node v it has to bear a cost of w (u, v) .
Some paths of the resulting network can be used to carry potential trades that benefi t all the players along those paths. More precisely, for each ordered pair (u, v) there is the potential for a trade of value g (u, v) to be realised. For the trade to be realised there must be a path of length less than k 0 in the network. A cost c (u, v) is associated to each edge (u, v) of the network. The cost of using a path is simply the sum of the costs of all its edges. For each pair (u, v) ∈ N 2 a uv-path of minimum cost can be selected for the trade if it is an admissible path, that is, a path of length not more than k 0 and whose costs do not exceed g (u, v) . 2 If more than one such admissible path of minimum cost exist then the path used to perform the trade is selected randomly among all admissible paths of minimum cost, the uniform probability distribution being used. Each node of the selected admissible uv-path of minimum cost u = u 1 , u 2 , ..., u k = v receives an equal share of the aggregate net profi t g(u 1 , u k ) − (c(u 1 , u 2 ) + c(u 2 , u 3 ) + ... + c(u k−1 , u k )) derived from the trade, that is:
The player u i are called the intermediaries of the trade. The two players u 1 and u k are its fi nal intermediaries, while players u 2 , ..., u k−1 are its strict intermediaries. Players build edges such as to maximise their expected payoff function.
Theoretical justifi cation of the equal profi t splitting allocation rule can be found in Siedlarek. Indeed, in the author model of stochastic bargaining involving different chains of intermediaries, when the discount factor of the bargaining model tends to 0, that is, when players do not have suffi cient time to bargain over the splitting of profi ts without missing the trade opportunity (and thus become very impatient), the expected payoff of each intermediary become equal 3 . We are 2 Deleting this assumption would result in a different still interesting problem, where the nodes of the network are actually obliged to perform the transaction, even in case they take a net loss. 3 Defi ning the profi t rule such that the fi rst intermediary on a chain of intermediaries derives all the benefi t from a given trade gives rise to a simpler, yet also interesting, problem. In such a setting, where node A earns the whole profi t derived from settling the trade of g − kw when at the beginning of an intermediation chain of length k, one can easily prove that: 1) if w ≥ g − c then the empty network is a NE, and that it is the only NE if we assume further that w ≥ g − c + (g − 2c)(n − 2) 2) the complete network is the only strict NE if, and only if, c > w. 3) a directed cycle is a NE if, and only if, g − c + g − 2c + ... + g − (n − 1)c > w. taking this view here; the opposite view would be to assume agents have plenty of time to bargain before moving on to carry out the trade; in such a case, according to, intermediaries which are not "essential" -meaning there exists, in the network, another chain of intermediaries to which they do not belong -would earn a profi t of zero.
Throughout this paper we will assume that w, c, and g are constant functions. Hence the above profi t simply reduces to
To write down players' payoffs explicitly under this hypothesis it is useful to defi ne a minimum path, as minimum path correspond to path of minimum costs:
Defi nition 4 A minimum uv-path is a path from u to v of minimum cardinality. The set of all minimum uv-paths is denoted by P uv , and the length of any minimum uv-path by d (u, v) 
Since the cost function is constant, the set P uv of minimum uv-path is precisely the set of paths of minimum costs, from u to v and the set P uv k 0 # of minimum uv-path of cardinality less or equal than k 0 is precisely the set of admissible uv-paths. The full expression of the payoff function for agent i of the network in the game , , w c g G k n 0^h can then be expressed as:
We will always denote by k 0 the maximum number of intermediaries allowed in the rule of the game, and set k 0 = +∞ if chains of intermediaries of arbitrary length are allowed. Note that for any given game with n players, allowing an infi nite number of intermediaries is equivalent to allowing at most n intermediaries. That is, for all n, we have:
h . Also note that in the formula giving agent u's profi ts we always have d(u, v) ∈ {1, 2, ..., k 0 } for all pairs of nodes (A,B) which appear in the sum. Finally, because paths of cardinality k such that g < (k − 1)c are not admissible, we have that for all n, , , , , Because this payoff function takes into account the overall structure of the network by making the set of all minimum paths containing u a pre-requisite for computing u's profi ts, it can be very diffi cult to characterise all nodes' strategies that result in a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, because from a given strategy a unilateral deviation from a given player consists in building or deleting edges starting at u at the same time, thus reshaping the set of all minimum paths in a way diffi cult to predict, we will often resort to the more general notion of stability:
Defi nition 7 A network G is stable (resp. strictly stable), if, and only if, adding or deleting any single edge (u, v) would not increase agent u's profi ts (resp. strictly increase agent u's profi ts).
This would translate the idea that given an initial network, each node in turn only considers one edge at the time, computing whether it would be better off by severing it if this edge is in the network or by creating it if it is not in the network. In a stable network no node would add or delete an edge.
Proposition 8 If G is a Nash equilibrium (resp. strict Nash equilibrium) then it is stable (resp. strictly stable).
The proof is trivial and follows from defi nitions. Hence establishing some necessary properties of stable networks certainly establishes the same properties for the more restricted class of Nash equilibrium networks. The converse need not be true, although stable graphs which are not Nash equilibria are not straightforward to construct. The question of defi ning a family of stable graphs which are not Nash equilibria is thus left open.
RESULTS
Bounds to the diameter
The diameter of a network is thus the maximum distance between any two nodes of the network. Note that the diameter of a network is fi nite if, and only if, the network is strongly connected.
Proposition 13 If
-, then any stable network is strongly connected and its diameter satisfi es
and ( The proof of the bound validity is provided in Annex 6. The stability of the directed circle of the mentionned diameter is easy to prove by symmetry.
Notice in passing that another (weaker) necessary condition for the minimum path to be able to carry out a trade is that g − Δc > 0 ie Δ ≤ g/c. Hence the above results also contains the somehow simpler condition that Δ ≤ g/c.
Extreme cases: no links, or all the links
The empty network
Proposition 14 If w g c 2 #
-then the empty network is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If any player deviates unilaterally from the strategy profi le yielding the empty network, it means it has built some number k of edges. But building such edges incurs a cost of kw, and a profi t of only k g c 2 -
, this player is not better off. ■ Clearly, if a strict inequality holds, the empty network becomes a strict Nash equilibrium.
Note that if g c w g c 2 1 # --deviating would be socially strictly more effi cient. Indeed, the aggregate profi t would be of g − c − w > 0.
Remark 15 This proposition does not imply that the empty network is the only Nash equilibrium.
For example, assume g > 2c and
Then the circle of cardinality three is a strict Nash equilibrium, as well as the empty network.
Nevertheless we have the following result:
, then the empty network is the only strict stable network (and the only strict Nash equilibrium).
The proof is provided in Annex 6. 46 and thus by Proposition 13 the network is strongly connected. We then prove a property called transitivity: if (A,B) is in the network and (B,C) is in the network then (A,C) is in the network. Together with strong connectivity it can easily be checked that it implies the network G is the complete network.
The complete network
Let (A,B) and (B,C) be two edges in the network. Assume by contradiction that the edge (A,C) is not in the network. Then the additional profi t for A to build edge (A,C) is equal to the sum of the additional gains from trades of type (A,C) and of the intermediation fees from all new minimum paths using AC, minus the cost w of building AC. Since the additional gains from being able to settle trades with C directly (without using B as an intermediary) are g c g c w 2 2 3 2 ---, the node A is willing to create the edge (A,C), a contradiction with stability. Hence the edge (A,C) was already there. This concludes the proof. ■
Intermediate cases
The following results single out the complete star as being a remarkable structure, since it is always a Nash equilibrium when the costs of building new edges are neither too high, nor too low, and this no matter the length k 0 − 1 ≥ 2 of the intermediary chains allowed. Again, there may exists other Nash equilibriums, like the triangle mentioned in Remark 15. The inequality, if strict, characterises stars that are strict Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, the condition for a complete star to be a stable network (resp. strict stable network) is the same as for being a Nash equilibrium (resp. strict Nash equilibrium):
Proposition 19 Assume g > 2c. Then stable complete stars are also Nash equilibria.
The proof is provided in Annex 6.
Notice that, holding all parameters except n constant and making n tend towards infi nity, there exists a threshold from which the complete star becomes a Nash equilibrium. This translates the fact that when the number of agents in the economy increases, it becomes more useful to have a single intermediary (and pay to it fees for its intermediation services) than to establish connections towards each individual agent.
Remark 20 This does not imply that a subnetwork or a induced subnetwork of a network which is a star will be stable if it satisfi es this condition, since strategic considerations involving nodes outside the star may dominate. For example, if a star is a subnetwork of a bigger network and some leaf A of the star is linked to many vertices outside the star, another leaf B of the star may want to establish a direct link to A to derive higher profi ts from trades with those out-neignboors of A which are not in the star (avoiding the center of the star as an intermediary for such trades). Hence, the concept of stability of a network does not translate easily to its subnetworks.
We now turn our attention specifi cally to the case where only a maximum of three intermediaries is allowed. Although such an assumption is clearly restrictive, this model will still capture the dependency of a node's strategic choice relatively to the overall network topology. Hence, the three intermediary case sheds some light on the nature of strategic interactions better.
As previously shown, for some constellations of parameters the complete star, the complete network or the empty network are stable networks or Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, to characterise all stable networks or Nash equilibria for any constellation of parameters is still an open question even in the three intermediary case.
Characterisation of stable d-regular uninetworks
We saw that when the cost of establishing an edge w is neither too high nor too low, the complete star is always a stable network and a Nash-equilibrium. The complete star exhibits two striking structural features. First, in a star any two nodes are linked only by a unique path, hence there is no other admissible path for agents to carry out any given trade than this single path. Second, the star shows a singular asymmetry: the center has to sustain the costs of all links towards the other vertices of the star, and derives benefi ts from all the trades of the network, whereas the leaves have only to pay for a single link, but are the strict intermediaries of no trade. This is refl ected at the level of individual nodes by a very high degree asymmetry, with the center being of the highest possible in and out-degree and the leaves being of in and out-degree 1, the lowest possible in and out-degree in a connected graph.
A natural question is thus to ask if a more "balanced" structure -by which we mean more symmetry in the underlying network -would necessarily provide alternative paths for dealing with a same given trade. Can symmetric networks be stable without providing for more than one alternative paths to carry out trades?
More precisely, when parameters are homogenous, game theory often studies symmetric equilibria, that is, equilibria where all players play the same strategy. This is because this approach is consistent with not favouring one agent more than another in predicting which network will emerge from the game 4 .
A symmetric equilibrium results in a vertex-transitive graph, that is, a graph G for which, for any players i, j there exists a graph automorphism σ of G such that σ(i) = j. Hence, both i and j are indeed playing exactly the same action with respect of the other nodes once a proper relabelling of the names of the players has been applied. Symmetric equilibrium thus result in (often excessively) "balanced" networks. In particular, these networks are d-regular, since it is easy to check that all their nodes will have both in and out-degree d.
Because we believe the notion of symmetric equilibrium is actually too strong, in what follows we will actually study the more general case of regular networks (some regular networks do not arise from symmetric strategies, but from other, less stringent, strategies). Hence, the question is: does there exist regular network which are stable and do not provide with alternative paths to settle trades?
, that is, a maximum number k 0 of intermediaries allowed, a uninetwork is a network such that each trade (A,B) has precisely one corresponding admissible path. For example, in the case of G n 3 , that is, when a maximum of three intermediaries is allowed, a uninetwork is such that for any trade (A,B) either A is directly linked to B or there exists a unique intermediary C such that (A,C) and (C,B) are in the network. Consequently the structures depicted in Figure 3 cannot be subnetworks of any uninetwork of a game G n 3 , and, by extension, of any uninetwork of G k n for k ≥ 3. In our model, we do not require a given node A to possess a closed path towards itself to carry out a trade from itself to itself. Nevertheless, to use results from algebraic graph theory, we need to make this a requirement here, that is, we need to ask that in a uninetwork there is precisely one single admissible path from any node A to any node B with possibly B = A. Admittedly, this imposes more structure than should have been the case, but this additional requirement enable us to use the classic algebraic result that the (i, j)th entry of the kth power of the adjacency matrix of a graph gives the exact number of walks from node v i to node v j . We use one of the main theorem of Gimbert to derive a necessary condition for a regular uninetwork to be stable. For the games G k n with k ≥ 4, the inexistence of stable regular uninetwork is straightforwardly implied by a result from the literature that there exists no regular uninetwork with a unique path of length at most l for l ≥ 3 between any two vertices.
Defi nition 21 Given a network G the line-network of G is the network LG with set of nodes V(LG) = E(G), the set of edges of G, and where a node (A,B) of V(LG) is linked to a node (C,D) of V(LG) if, and only if, B = C in G.
Theorem 22 [Gimbert] The proof is provided in Annex 6.
Hence, although there exist stable regular networks which fail to provide more alternative paths for carrying out any given trade, the number of those networks is very limited: by Gimbert Theorem (Theorem 22), they are the line graphs of complete graphs, and by Proposition 23, only the constellation parameters satisfying the inequality stated in Proposition 23 are stable.
In conclusion, more symmetry in network structures undoubtedly favour the existence of alternative paths to settle trades, and the exceptions to this rule are few and fully caracterised in this section. Figure 13 summarises the results obtained so far. 
Summary of Nash equilibria and stable networks
OBTAINING CORE-PERIPHERY NETWORKS FROM STARS
Real-life networks are seldom completely built from scratch. Rather, they usually arise from linking up pre-existing networks. In a market-environment with no central social planner, linking up is left to the incentives of individuals. Hence there is always the possibility that the linking, left to individualistic profi t-maximising agents, would not result in an effi cient network for the whole, even though taken individually each pre-existing network (which could be thought as, for example, national markets before the opening of their borders) was effi cient. That is, the incentives of the agents in linking these different historical networks may not lead to an effi cient network of the whole.
The notion of incentives is, in our framework, captured by the notion of stability and Nash equilibrium. Indeed, by defi nition in a strict Nash equilibrium no player would add and/or delete any set of links, since it would result in a lower payoff for him. In a strict stable network, no player would add a single new link nor delete a single existing link for the same reason. Now the problem of knowing if letting individual agents linking separated networks leads to an effi cient network can be easily formalised in the following way: a certain number of effi cient networks H 1 , H 2 ,..., H k are suddenly considered as the different disjoint parts of a (bigger) aggregate network G. Which structure will arise? Will this structure be effi cient? Are there many different structures that can arise from such an operation or is the outcome predictable? Defi nition 24 allows to formalize the concept of an aggregate network obtained in a way that preserves its individual components in an endogeneous maner. Moreover, it provides a way to conceptualise the building up of a specifi c core-periphery network, which we show can be seen as resulting from the linking up of a set of disjoint stars.
Defi nition 24 A network G has a partition {H i , i ∈ I} of subnetworks if, and only if, each H i is a subnetwork of G, and each node of G belongs to a unique H i . In other words: E (H i ) ⊆ E(G) for all i ∈ I and V (G) = V H i i I d^h
&
We see that asking G to be stable, or to be a Nash equilibrium, is actually simply rephrasing the previous problem in the particular case where none of the "pre-existing" networks H 1 , H 2 ,..., H k has been modifi ed -and thus all are still present as such in the resulting aggregate network. That is, "domestic" structures were preserved and linked in a way compatible with the individual incentives of each node. How does this linking occur? Does it lead to an effi cient network for the whole without the need for coordination of the economic agents involved? Important to notice is that the preservation of the subnetworks H 1 , H 2 ,..., H k is not linked to sunk costs (costs to establish their links that were already paid for and hence less profi table to destroy), but follow the same general one-period game setting than the rest of the paper. In that sense the networks can be seen more as refl ecting domestic agents' "habits" for paying for and using a domestic, local network, than as refl ecting some legacy infrastructure already built. This makes the results of this subnetwork "preservation" and the study of the emerging core-periphery network that follows all the more striking.
A simple example where the answer is affi rmative is for parameter constellations such that w g c 6 1 + . Indeed, by Proposition 17 we know that the unique Nash equilibrium network in that case is the complete network, and it is easily checked that it is also effi cient. Now it can easily be show that taking the union of any number of complete networks will result in a global network which is also complete, hence also effi cient for such constellations of parameters: since w g c 2 1 -the union, at equilibrium, will be strongly connected. Because w g c g c g c 6 3 2 2 1 + = ---one can prove that transitivity holds at equilibrium, and conclude as in the proof of Proposition 17.
Theorem 26 and Theorem 27 focus on the case where all the graphs H i are complete stars (possibly of different sizes). These theorems provide a condition under which the supremacy of the centers of a star is in fact re-enforced by aggregation, since each leaf wants to send a link to the center of each foreign stars on top of maintaining the link towards its own domestic center, and do not link to other nodes than the centers. This proves that, for some constellation of parameters, aggregation of different markets can actually increase the power of the historical "oligopoly" (formed by the centers of the stars) instead of creating new, alternative intermediation chains. This also provides an example of stable core-periphery network under homogeneous cost assumption.
We then prove that, for a wide range of parameters, these resulting networks are Paretodominated by the complete star. In particular, they cannot be effi cient. More precisely, we will prove that the leaves would always be better off in a complete star, while for the center s i of star S i this depends on a condition that interlinks the size of the network, the size of S i and the number of other stars. 
Defi nition 25 Defi ne a multistar as a network G having a partition {S
then G is a multistar with partition {S i , i ∈ I} of complete stars.
The proof of Theorem 26 is provided in Annex 6.
In the more general case where chains of intermediaries of arbitrary length are allowed, a similar theorem can be proved (Theorem 27), with a different threshold: 
then G is the unique network such that 1) it contains the {S i , i ∈ I} as subnetworks, and 2) each of the node v ∉ {s i , i ∈ I} is linked to precisely all the {s i , i ∈ I}. 3) Each center s i is linked to precisely all the nodes in S i ∪ {s j , j ∈ I\{i}}.
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 26 provided in the Annex, and thus omitted there. Theorem 26 and Theorem 27 can be interpreted as follows: if each center has some large enough "private" market (larger than the d 0 threshold, which is not larger than the upper bound given by the theorem), that is, a set of participants which can only be accessed using the center as an intermediary, then all the other leaves will decide to link to those centers, and to those centers only. Theorem 26 and Theorem 27 thus considerably restrict the number of possible structures in equilibrium.
Conversely to Theorem 26, it can be proved that this unique possible structure is indeed a Nash equilibrium if we add the well known and usual necessary condition that 
Effi ciency comparison between stars and multistars
The previous section showed how multistars can endogenously arise from the linking up of stars, with each star having its previous links preserved, as formalised in Defi nition 24. Assume G is a multistar with partition {S i , i ∈ I} of complete stars S i of center
for all i, and g c w g c n g c 6 2 2 3
, we know by Proposition 18 and Proposition 28 that both the complete star and the multistar are strict Nash equilibrium. The question then arises to know which of the two networks is the most effi cient from an aggregate perspective (social welfare). This has clear policy implications, if we remember that the multistar arises naturally as an equilibrium when the re-organisation of the network obtained from various disjoint stars is left to the individual, profi t-maximising agents of each of the stars. We characterise parameter constellations for which, from an aggregate utility perspective, the star is always a more effi cient network than a multistar. Notice that the arising ineffi ciencies of multistars do not come from the fi xed investments spent for building links, but lie uniquely in the new individual incentives for reshaping the network that take into account the a preferred local structure and thus are not enough to lead to an effi cient resulting network. This fi nding has obvious policy implications, such as the potential benefi ts of the intervention of a "social planner" for re-arranging by itself the network or for acting as a catalyst for coordination among the different players, or for introducing incentives exogenous to the network that could help fostering a more effi cient aggregate network.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a specifi c rule for sharing profi ts along intermediary chains, which entails natural yet apparently complex payoffs and strategic behaviour from the network agents. We analyzed different general network structures, and derived the conditions for those networks to be stable -that is, no individual in the network would be better off by adding or deleting a link it has some power on. We defi ned a notion of graph partition that translates the existence of substructures preserved yet incorporated in a larger, aggregate network and studied the case of a particular type of core-periphery structure that can be seen as resulting from linking up a set of disjoint stars. This structure, or multistar, is a core-periphery network that allows for different vertex degrees between the different centers which form its core, and we prove it is stable for a large set of parameter constellations without having to resort to heterogeneity assumptions. We derived conditions under which stable multistars are not effi cient nor Paretoeffi cient. This emphasises the theoretical need, in some instances, for a "social planner" to rearrange the network or at least act as a catalyst in the new network formation, in particular in complex networks obtained by linking pre-existing networks, even when these smaller networks were, individually taken, effi cient. Further work is needed to characterise, in this context, the whole set of effi cient networks, as well as of stable networks and Nash equilibrium network, but this appears to be a diffi cult tasks, in particular when longer chains of intermediaries are allowed, because of the strategic considerations at play that take into account a larger portion of the topology of the network. Proof. We fi rst prove that any stable network is strongly connected, and then derives the upperbound for its diameter. Let G be a stable network and suppose it is not strongly connected. Let A and B be two nodes such that there exists no path going from A to B. Building the edge (A,B) would incur a cost of w to node A but an additional profi t of at least g c 2 -. Indeed, the trade with B itself already provides A with a profi t of g c 2 -, to which may be added other intermediation fees from the possible admissible paths using the newly created edge (A,B). Since w g c 2 1
APPENDIX
Proofs of theorems
Proposition 13
the node A would be willing to build (A,B). This contradicts the stability of the network G.
Consider a minimum path P of length Δ, P = A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , ..., A Δ and assume Δ ≥ 2 (the case where Δ ≤ 1 can be readily checked since for network with at least two nodes, w g c 2 1
implies -, A 0 would certainly be willing to pay for creating an edge towards A Δ if it could not use the minimum path A 0 = A, A 1 , A 2 ,..., A Δ for carrying out trades with A Δ , in which case we would have a contradiction with the minimality of P. Stability thus implies that this path can be used, hence that its length Δ is at most k 0 − 1. Also, stability requires that the benefi ts derived by A 0 from trading with A Δ by using this minimum path is no less than the benefi ts it would get if it chose to establish a direct link with A Δ , idem est that 
To prove that the directed circle attain the bound under the conditions mentioned, just consider that the condition for any vertex not to delete its single link is that
Notice in passing that another (weaker) necessary condition for the minimum path to be able to carry out trade is that g − Δc > 0 ie Δ ≤ g/c. Hence the above results also contains the somehow simpler condition that Δ ≤ g/c.
Proposition 16 If
:
h h h h , then the empty network is the only strict stable network (and the only strict Nash equilibrium).
Proof. Suppose g ≤ 2c. Without loss of generality k 0 ≤ 2 and the assumption becomes that w g c 2 $
-. This implies that the direct gains for A from establishing a link towards B are g c w 2 0 1 --. Hence no node A will ever choose to maintain a link. This results in a empty network.
Suppose g > 2c and that w > l 0 . It is enough to show that l 0 is the maximal additional profi t a node A can hope for by establishing a link. Since the costs w are superior to l 0 it will then follow that no node A will ever want to maintain a link, and that the empty network is the only Nash equilibrium for such parameter constellations. To show that l 0 is an upper bound for the additional profi ts derived by establishing a single edge AB, we start from any graph G and prove by successive reductions than the additional profi t a node A can derive by establishing an edge AB cannot be more than the additional profi t node A would derive from edge AB in a particular graph K 0 , whose structure is known and in which A derives from AB an additional profi t less or equal to l 0 .
Additional profi ts for A derived from establishing a new edge AB stems from: -the direct trade with B, which amounts to at most g c 2 --this upper-bound corresponding to the case where there were no admissible path going from A to B prior to the establishment of the link (A,B). -the profi ts from trades involving more than two intermediaries and using a chain P of intermediaries which fi nishes with the edge AB. Assume such chain contains more than four intermediaries, and let P =: C...DAB. Then A derives less profi ts in such a graph from trades CB than it would if C was a in-neighbours of A, the reason being it has to share the profi ts from trade CB with more intermediaries (for example, with D). Hence A obtains no less profi ts in the graph G′ obtained from G by adding all edges pointing towards A, than in G.
These profi ts amounts to a profi t from these trades of less or equal to n g c 2 2 3 --h in G′. -the profi ts from trades involving more than two intermediaries and using a chain P of intermediaries which starts with the edge AB. Similarly, A obtains no less profi ts in the graph G′′ obtained from G′ by adding all edges starting from the node B, than in G′. These profi ts amounts to a profi t from these trades of less or equal to n g c 2 2 3 --h in G′′. -the profi ts from trades involving more than three intermediaries and using a chain P of intermediaries in which both A and B are strict intermediaries. Note these profi ts can only be positive if k 0 > 3. Also, these profi ts are maximal when no node in V (G)\{A,B} is linked to another node of V (G)\{A,B}. Indeed, in such a confi guration any node in V (G)\{A,B} has to use the node A to carry out a trade with another node from V (G)\{A,B}. Hence, A obtains no less profi ts in the graph G 0 obtained from G′′ by deleting all edges between two nodes in V (G)\{A,B} than in G′′. These profi ts amounts to n g c n 2 1 3 4 is the additional profi t derived by node A by establishing the link AB in the graph K 0 , and that it is an upper-bound for the additional profi t derived by node A by establishing the link AB in the initial graph G. Since this holds for all G, we have a general upper-bound. ■
